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The Moral Basis 




olitical meritocracy is the view that members of the 
legislative branch must be chosen and promoted on the 
basis of their individual skills, character and performance. 
Democratic and meritocratic theories differ from one another not 
in the types of political agencies that they support, but in the 
governmental body to which meritocratic selection criteria apply. 
Several democratic theories require selecting the members of the 
judiciary branch through meritocratic mechanisms, but only 
meritocratic theories allow for the extension of meritocratic 
selection principles to the composition of the legislature.1 
In practice, political meritocracy is compatible with democratic 
institutions in various ways. Recently, Daniel A. Bell has argued 
  
1 For a defense of meritocratic selection systems outside the legislative branch, 
???? ???????? ????????? ??????????????? ??????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ??????????
review and regulatory agencies are insulated from direct electoral 
????????????????? ????????? ???????? ?Meritocratic Democracy: Learning from 
??????????????????????????? in Bell D. and Li C. (eds.), The East Asian Challenge 
for Democracy:  Political Meritocracy in Comparative Perspective, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, 232?256). Also Philip Pettit claims that a 
democratic system of a large modern society requires establishing meritocratic 
agencies ??? ???????? ???????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ??? ?????? ?????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
and Li C. (eds.), The East Asian Challenge for Democracy:  Political Meritocracy in 
Comparative Perspective, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 147). 
P 
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for a political system for modern China, in which democratic 
institutions operate only at the local political level, while 
meritocratic mechanisms function at the national level.2 
Tongdong Bai (2013), Bell (2006) and Joseph Chan (2014;; 2013) 
propose a bicameral system in which meritocratic selection 
mechanisms choose the members of the upper house, which has 
the strongest legislative power, while the members of the lower 
house are chosen by democratic mechanisms.3 Another view is 
that democratic institutions must have a final say on the choice of 
the legislative and meritocratic selection and promotion 
mechanisms of the leaders can be deployed to balance democratic 
institutions by e???????? ?? ???????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????????????
abilities and effectiveness of the government in relation to the 
achievement of long-term collective interests (e.g. climate change, 
security, the use of natural resources, the development of a 
forward-looking education system).4  
Whether we value political meritocracy as an overarching 
principle of governance or as an auxiliary mechanism to improve 
  
2 Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). A similar philosophical theory 
??? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ????????? ???? ??? ??? ???????? ???????? ???
?? ????? ???????????Res Publica, Vol. 14, 2008), 19?34. 
3 Tongdong Bai, ?A Confucian Version of Hybrid Regime: How Does It 
?????? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??? ??? ???????? The East Asian 
Challenge for Democracy: Political Meritocracy in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 55?87. Daniel A. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: 
Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press). Joseph Chan, ??????????? ??????????????? ?????????????????????????????
???????????? (Bell D. and Li C. (eds.), The East Asian Challenge for Democracy: 
 Political Meritocracy in Comparative Perspective, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 31?54. 
4 ?? ??????? ????? ????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????? ??????????? ???????????? ???
????????????? ?????????? ????????????? ??????????? ????????????????????????? 
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a democratic decision-making process, the moral justification for 
meritocratic distributions of legislative power needs to be 
formulated. Specifically, what gives the most competent and 
meritorious the right to rule? This is a crucial question for any 
meritocratic theory which aims to be taken seriously as a political 
principle by Western scholars. Meritocratic measures are mostly 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the 
reason why political outcomes should matter more than other 
criteria in the first place is open to question. In fact, non-
instrumental defenses of democracy are very popular in the 
Western context. Some egalitarians contend that democratic 
institutions are intrinsically good regardless of their outcomes, 
because they embody the moral equality of the citizens,5 while 
others maintain that democracy is necessary for achieving 
equality.6 In contrast, deliberative theorists believe that 
democracy is the only legitimate form of governance, because 
  
5 Harry Brighouse, ??????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
(The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 1996), 118?141. Thomas 
Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory (Boulder: 
Westview Press ????????????????????? ???????? ??????????????????????????Reeve 
A. and Williams A. (eds.), Real Libertarianism Assessed: political theory after Van 
Parijs, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 172???????Debate: Estlund on 
Democratic Authority?? ?Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2009), 
228?240. Christopher Griffin, ??????????? ??? ?? ???-Instrumentally Just 
????????????Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 111, Issue 1, 2003), 111?121. 
6 Elisabeth Anderson, ???????????????????????????????? (Ethics, Vol. 103, Issue 
9, 1999), 287?337;; ??????????? Instrumental vs. Non-Instrumental ???????
(Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, Christiano T. and Christman J. (eds.), 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 213?227?? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ???
????????????????? ?Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 31, Issue 1, 2003), 5?39. 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: 
Martin Robertson, 1983). Niko Kolodny, ????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 42, Issue 
4, 2004, 287?336). 
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only democracy can provide people a place to develop their 
preferences and a fair opportunity to influence the decisional 
outcome.7 Thus, as contemporary meritocratic theories aim to go 
beyond a Confucian perspective to reach out to a broader 
audience, a justification of political meritocracy based on some 
fundamental Western values must be articulated.8  
By relating the notion of political meritocracy to the debate on 
equality of opportunity, this paper illustrates that political 
meritocracy can be understood as the expression of a principle of 
substantive equality of political opportunity. I claim that two 
main tenets should characterize the ideal of political meritocracy: 
  
7 ??????? ??????? ?????????????? ???? ??????????? ?????? ????? ???????? ??? ????
Pettit P. (eds.), The Good Polity, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17?34. 
???????????? ?????????? ?Ethics, Vol. 99, Issue 4, 1989), 727?751?? ?????????e 
???? ?????????? ??? ????????????? ??????????? ?????????? ??? ????????Democracy and 
Difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 95?119. ????? ??
??????????? ????????? ?The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, in Freeman S (eds.), 
Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 86?138. John Dryzek, 
Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why 
Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Jurgen 
Habermas, ???????????????? ???????? ???? ??????? ???? ??? ???????? ???????? ???
????? ???????? ?????????? ???????????? ?The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 92,1995), 
109?31. Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MIT Press,1996). ???????
?????????? ????????? ????????????????????????????????Democracy and Difference, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 21?30. 
8 This does not exclude the fact that the Confucian justification of meritocratic 
selection systems remains contested. One criticism is that it is unclear whether 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
??? ???????? ???? ???????-??????????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ??????????
meritocracy (Tan Sor-???????????????????????????????????Ideal for Modern 
????????????Philosophy East and West, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2009, 544. Sungmoon Kim, 
Confucian Democracy in East Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, 
80).  
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on the one hand, political meritocracy requires selecting and 
promoting candidates based on their performance, qualities, and 
skills that are relevant to the political positions;; and on the other 
hand, it ought to provide people with equal chances to develop 
these abilities and expertise. As such, political meritocracy can 
compete on an equal footing with another interpretation of the 
principle of substantive equality of political opportunity, namely 
democratic equality of fair opportunity. 
Another reason why the assessment of political meritocracy 
from an egalitarian standpoint should concern proponents of 
Confucian meritocracy is that political meritocracy can be 
considered a threat to equality, because it denies the equal 
competence of other people to rule and justifies the domination 
of a minority in society.9 On the contrary, I argue that in some 
socio-economic contexts, egalitarians can have reasons to support 
some forms of political meritocracy, if these provide better 
outcomes. However, no member of society can make a claim to 
political office on the basis of her individual merits.  
Section 1 starts by exploring how Western literature has 
??????????? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????lity of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ?????????????? ????????? ???????? ?? ?????? ????? ????????????? ?????
reasons to support meritocratic mechanisms, if they can provide 





(Philosophy East and West, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2009), 537. 
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I 
Equality of opportunity 
Merit concerns the qualities that an individual possesses. It 
differs from the concept of desert in that deserts are attributed to 
???? ????????????? deeds.10 Merit is a forward-looking ideal;; when we 
attribute merit to people, we usually think that they possess some 
qualifications that make them suitable for carrying out some tasks 
in the future.11 On the contrary, desert-based judgments are 
backward-looking. When we perform desert-judgments, we believe 
that an individual deserves something based on what she did or 
achieved in the past.12  
However, in practice, most of our merit-based judgments take 
past deeds as predictors of merit. They aim to identify the 
????????????? ??????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
???? ????????? ??? ????????? ???? ???????? ????? ???? ????????????
previous experiences and achievements provide sufficient 
evidence of her qualities. Thus, our merit-based judgments are 
usually ceteris paribus judgments: we believe that, with other 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be as good as in the past.13  
  
10 John Lucas, Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 125. 
11 David Miller, Principles of Social Justice (Cambridge MASS: Harvard University 
Press 1999), 137. 
12 Ibid., the concept of merit is also context-sensitivite. As John Rawls points out, 
whether somebody has merit partly depends on the social context in which is 
evaluated (A Theory of Justice, revised edition, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971/1999, 82?87). For instance, knowing how to cook excellent 
Argentinean asados may not be valued in a vegetarian society, but the same 
ability can be highly praised in a carnivore society.  
13 Ibid.,  
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In Western literature, the idea of merit is typically associated 
with the principle of equality of opportunity (EO for short). This 
principle builds on the assumption that the well-functioning of 
modern complex societies requires societies to adopt some 
division of labor. Distinct positions in this divisional order tend 
to entail different social advantages, such as prestige, 
remuneration and social power. From an egalitarian standpoint, 
the need of such order, together with the unequal allocation of 
social advantages that are tied to it, raises the question of how 
such allocation can be fair to all citizens.  
To address this problem, EO aims to distinguish morally 
justified socio-economic structures from unacceptable ones. This 
is done by equalizing the chances of getting a position for 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
must face an array of options that is equivalent to every other 
person in terms of the prospects for preference satisfaction it 
????????14 One conceptualization of EO is formal equality of 
opportunity (or career open to talents). This principle states that a 
differentiated order is fair to the extent that it allocates socially 
advantaged positions on the basis of merit. Formal equality of 
opportunity maintains that a) positions and posts with superior 
social advantages should be open to all members of society;; b) 
applicants are assessed in relation to their merits;; and c) the posts 
must be assigned to the applicants with relevant superior 
qualities.  
The idea of formal equality of opportunity is non-
discriminatory compared to alternative hierarchical structures or 
orders that allocate social advantages based on gender, social 
connections, race or religion. However, in a society characterized 
  
14 ???????? ????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ???????????? ???? ?????????
(Philosophical Studies, Vol. 56, 1989), 85. 
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by socio-economic inequalities, formal equality of opportunity 
fails to guarantee substantive equal opportunity. The upbringing 
and the socioeconomic and political circumstances in which 
individuals happen to live are paramount aspects for the 
???????????? ??? ?????? ???? talents. Thus, although the principle 
recognizes that all individuals have equal chances to obtain a 
certain position, it ignores the fact that typically the members of a 
society have different starting-point in the race for that position. 
Under these circumstances, the implementation of formal 
equality of opportunity risks justifying the perpetuation of old 
discredited hierarchies and social inequalities.15  
The principle of substantive equality of opportunity aims to 
overcome the paradoxical consequences of formal equality of 
opportunity. According to this idea, the achievement of EO 
requires not only a meritocratic selection system but also that a 
genuine opportunity to become qualified is presented to all 
members of the society. This latter idea, equality of access, is meant 
  
15 This pejorative effect of formal equality of opportunity was first highlighted 
by Bernard Williams. Williams imagines a hypothetical society that is governed 
by a class of wealthy warriors. At some point, to mitigate the increasing 
popular dissatisfaction with the current elitist rule, the warriors decide that the 
future leaders will not be picked in relation to their family ties anymore, but 
solely in relation to their physical strength. In this new setting, formal equality 
of opportunity is finally achieved: now all members of society are recognized 
and given the same chance to become a ruler if they wish so. However, little 
would change in the composition of the ruling class?Williams argues?if only 
the wealthiest warrior families can provide their children with enough 
nourishment to develop and exhibit superior physical strength (??????????????
??????????? ?????????? ??? Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Antology, R. E. 
Goodin and Pettit P. (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1962/1997, 451?461).  
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to prevent advantages or disadvantages for which the recipient 
cannot legitimately be held responsible.16  
The ideal of substantive equality of opportunity is widely 
accepted,17 but the principle of equality of access remains highly 
contested. One main point of contention is that it is hard to 
identify the sufficient level of possibilities to develop relevant 
qualities. In this regard, John Rawls proposes the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity as a benchmark to assess the achievement of 
equality of access in society. This principle states that equality of 
access is achieved only when the members of society with the 
same native talents and the same ambition have equal prospects 
of success in relation to competitions for positions.18 Fair equality 
of opportunity aims to correct formal equality of opportunity by 
requiring equal chances for the individuals to become equally 
well-???????? ??????????? ??? ??????? ??????????????? ??? ???????
account, society ought to develop the structural conditions to 
??????? ???????????? ????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????????
formation. ?????? market arrangements must be set within a 
framework of political and legal institutions which regulates the 
overall trends of economic events and preserves the social 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ?????????
  
16 Andrew Mason, ?????????????????????????????????????? (Ethics, Vol. 111, 
2001), 762. 
17 One exception to this is Antony Flew, who claims that open competitions 
for scarce opportunities are sufficient for equality of opportunity, as long as no 
one is excluded from the competition and the same rule applies to all 
candidates. (The Politics of Procrustes: contradictions of Enforced equality, London: 
Temple Smith, 1981), 45. 
18 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edition, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971/1999), 63. 
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Political Meritocracy as a Principle 
of Substantive Equality of Political Opportunity 
The functioning of large societies depends not only on a 
division of labor, but also on the division of political power. 
Complex and modern societies need a political system which is 
?????????????? ??? ???????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ???????????20  For 
this reason, any large modern society needs to distribute political 
power unequally among its members. This suggests that similar 
questions to the ones concerning the allocation of social positions 
apply to the division of political power among the members of a 
society. Indeed, if the existence of political inequalities is 
unavoidable, the identification of morally justified inequality of 
political power is in order.  
One way is to apply the idea of substantive equality of 
opportunity to the political dimension. Traditionally, the 
interpretation of this principle?democratic equality of fair 
opportunity?calls for ??????????? ??????????? ???????? ??? ?????
influence political decisions and stand for office if one seeks it, 
and for choosing candidates on the basis of free and fair 
elections.21 The idea of democratic equality of fair opportunity 
implies that: a) the candidates who deserve to rule are those who 
  
19 Ibid., 63. 
20 Robert Dahl and Bruce Stinebrickner, Modern political Analysis (Upper Saddle 
River NJ: Pearson, 1991), 52?53. 
21 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edition, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), 194?197. 
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obtain the most votes in elections (or those who have been 
appointed by law-makers elected according to such rules);; b) all 
adult citizens have genuine access to gain the qualities and 
conditions needed to compete in elections;; and c) all adult 
citizens have an equal right to participate in elections if they so 
wish.22  
Another interpretation of the principle of substantive equality 
of political opportunity is to select candidates based on the 
qualities and skills that are relevant to the political positions and 
provide the members of society with equal chances to develop 
these abilities and expertise?political meritocracy. For the principle 
of political meritocracy, the most meritorious candidates are not 
the ones who enjoy stronger public support, but rather those who 
have the skills and abilities to carry out the specific political job in 
the best way possible. Political meritocracy is compatible with 
political liberties, such as freedom of speech and association, 
freedom of thought and right to hold office. However, it is 
incompatible with the right to vote when this is understood as 
means to the selection of the leadership. Political meritocracy is 
thereby underpinned by a different conception of how a 
??????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
If democracy can be ???????????????????????????of the people, for 
the people, and by ???? ????????? ???????? ??? requires the direct 
involvement of some of the citizens?or their representatives?
in the decision-making process, political meritocracy can be 
??????????? ????????????????of the people, for the people, but not 
  
22 A political system based on these criteria parallels the definition of 
??????????????????????? equality and public control on the initial stage of the 
decision-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
theorists. (David Beetham, ????????????????????????? ????????????????Ethics & 
Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2009, 281). 
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by ???? ????????? ??? ????? ?????? ???? ????? ????? ??????? ???????? ??
meritocratic selection system can participate in the decision-
making process.  
As a principle of substantive equality of political opportunity, 
political meritocracy entails equality of access to acquire relevant 
qualities. This latter is crucial to ensure truly meritocracy;; in its 
absence, meritocratic selection would generate an unfair 
distribution of political power, because in practice allocation of 
political power would depend more on advantages or 
disadvantages for which the recipient cannot legitimately be held 
responsible (such as p?????????????????????????????????????????????
her merit. The claim that equality of access is a constitutive part 
of the concept of political meritocracy distinguishes my 
conception of political meritocracy from some contemporary 
meritocratic theories. For example, Bell acknowledges that 
???????????? meritocracy depends on high degree of economic 
?????????23 and argues for political measures to curb unjustified 
socio-economic inequalities, such as quotas in elite universities 
for students from disadvantaged social backgrounds. But, at the 
same time, he also maintains that these measures despite being 
????????????????????????? ?????? ????????????????? ?????????? ????? ???
????????????????????????????24 Contrary to Bell, according to my 
conception of political meritocracy, political measures like the 
above example are an expression of what meritocracy requires in 
practice.  
The relevance of equal opportunity for education to my 
conception of political meritocracy is clear: education is the 
paramount means through which an individual can acquire the 
  
23 Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 132. 
24 Ibid., 131. 
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relevant skills and knowledge to compete in the allocation of 
several political positions. Hence, society should guarantee to 
their citizens equal opportunities for education right from the 
start of their educational training, not only at the university level. 
Political meritocracy does not require neutralizing undeserved 
inequalities in education at the cost of levelling down the 
education of the children of better-off families. Education is one 
of the essential spheres of human life for an individual to 
flourish, as such society ought to provide the children of non-
wealthy parents with the same advantages as those of wealthy 
families, without depriving the children of wealthy families. This 
can be achieved, for example, by allocating more public funding 
to public schools or schools in poor neighborhoods. 
A concept of equal opportunity to acquire the relevant 
qualities is crucial for political meritocracy to defend itself from 
the accusations of elitism. Political meritocracy has often been 
accused of being an elitist idea.25 Some meritocrats also 
misidentified themselves as elitist, generating harsh criticisms.26 In 
general, to prevent elitism, political meritocracy should comply 
with civil and individual rights, freedom of the press and 
associations. Political decisions should also be transparent and 
publicly justified. However, the objective functionality of the 
institutions and the meritocratic selection is insufficient to avoid 
elitism. Suppose that it was agreed that academic records are one 
of the standards against which leaders should be chosen. Under 
these conditions, most likely a society that deploys some forms of 
  
25 Michael Young, The Rise of Meritocracy 1870-2033: An Essay on Education and 
Equality (London: Northumberland Press, 1958). 
26 Daniel A. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian 
Context (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006);; for a response, see Tan 
So-?????? ???????? ????????? ?? ?????????? ?????? ???? ?? ??????? ????? ??????
(Philosophy East and West, Vol. 59, Issue 4, 2009), 537?553.  
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meritocratic selection to choose its leaders according to academic 
record would generate a homogeneous elite if only the wealthiest 
can get access to the best education and training. Thus, equality 
of opportunity to acquire the qualities that are assessed by the 
meritocratic selection is essential for any meritocratic project. 
One question we might ask about the account I have given of 
political meritocracy is whether the superior political power of 
leaders that have been chosen by meritocratic procedures would 
express superior social status. Put in another way, can the denial 
of an equal share of decisional power over the basic ground rules 
of social life be a public declaration of a second-class citizenry? 27 
The answer is no. First of all, this argument presupposes the 
peculiarity of political relations. After all, not all inequalities of 
power and authority which derived from non-democratic means 
are necessarily controversial. Many of us accept inequalities of 
power and authority, such as those in parent-child, teacher-
student or team captain-team members relationships, where 
power has been distributed through non-democratic means, 
but those with more power and authority are expected to exercise 
them in the interests of all parties and in respectful ways. Thus, at 
least in some cases, the unequal distribution of decisional power 
does not mean a lowering of status for some persons who have 
less. Despite her lower decisional power, the student can still be 
equally respected, listened to, welcomed by her own teacher. This 
suggests that perhaps what makes an unequal distribution of 
power disrespectful depends more on how those with extra power 
use their favorable position and the rationale of a distribution of 
power than the inequality of decisional power in itself.  
  
27 Christopher Griffin makes a similar point in defense of political equality in 
??????????? ??? ?? ???-??????????????? ????? ??????????? ?Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Vol. 111, Issue 1, 2003), 120.  
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However, it is also true that power seems to work differently 
in practice. It is difficult to deny that even in some Western 
democratic societies, some people with more power (whether 
political or otherwise) often treat the others as inferior. The 
question of how political meritocracy can counter this trend is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can suppose that 
practices of political meritocracy call for a political discourse that 
emphasizes the equal dignity of all honest persons and jobs and 
does not put politicians on a pedestal. A political debate that 
???????? ?????????? ???????????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??? ????? ?????
?????????? ??? ????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ????????? ????????? ??? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
This language can also cultivate in the leaders the dangerous 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
attitude of elitism.28 As community leaders, politicians should set 
an example by making clear that their talents may be crucial for 
the society but not worthier than the ones that each member of 
the community employs in her occupations. Of course, some jobs 
are more fundamental for the well-being of the community than 
others, but as long as one contributes to the well-functioning of 
the community or its material and cultural progress, she deserves 
equal respect from her fellow citizens. Politicians should also 
express their respect for other talents and occupations through 
facts. One example could be the introduction of caps for the 
  
28 According to Benjamin Wong, a similar rhetoric is partially responsible for 
the attitude of elitism of many top public servants and leaders in Singapore. 
??????????????????????? ???? ????? ????? ????? ???? ??????? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ???????
companies in the relentless war for talent. As top public servants are constantly 
compared with successful professionals in the private sector, they come to 
???????? ????? ????? ???? ????? ??? ?? ??????? ??????? ???????????? ???????????? ???
???????????????????????????????????The East Asian Challenge for Democracy, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 300).   
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salary of politicians to curb distress in the public. Some may 
worry that in the absence of competing salaries, politics will fail 
to attract and retain talents, who will therefore join the private 
sector. But this argument is wrong. First of all, enforcing caps 
does not exclude the possibility for leaders to receive a generous 
remuneration. Second, government needs to attract a different 
type of candidates than business enterprises. Serving the interest 
of the people and not salary ought to be the main motivation to 
join politics. Thus, those who prioritizes salary over moral 
responsibility are clearly unsuitable to be a political leader. Hence, 
caps can even function as selection mechanisms to identify the 
candidates that are truly fit for political leadership. 
 
III 
Egalitarian reasons for Political Meritocracy 
The conception of political meritocracy above competes on 
equal basis with the principle of democratic equality of fair 
opportunity, but how egalitarians ought to choose between these 
alternative principles remains unclear. In particular, can 
egalitarians have a moral justification to prefer meritocratic 
mechanisms over the expression of democratic equality of fair 
opportunity? To answer this question an investigation on the 
????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? 
An egalitarian is somebody who cares about equality in itself.29 
This distinguishes egalitarianism, so understood, from another 
instrumental understanding of equality, which values equality 
  
29 Nils Holtung and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Egalitarianism: New Essays on 
the Nature and Value of Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2;; 
Shlomi Segall, Equality and Opportunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 31;; Larry Temkin, Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 7. 
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insofar as it promotes other valuable ideas.30 The belief in the 
intrinsic value of equality does not constrain egalitarians to care 
only about equality. Egalitarians may believe that there are other 
intrinsically valuable ideas besides equality. For this reason, 
several egalitarians have claimed to be pluralistic about values.31  
Some may contend that more than being concerned with 
equality in itself, an egalitarian should comply with the basic 
equality thesis. This is the idea that all human beings have equal 
moral status and should be treated equally or as equals in some 
respects. However, it is unclear whether the basic equality thesis 
is egalitarian in the proper sense of the term, because it is part of 
political theories that are usually considered to be not egalitarians, 
???????????????????????????????????????????? 
The basic equality thesis also has controversial metaphysical 
foundations. It is unclear what exactly people have in common 
such that they have equal moral status. Some scholars have tried 
to justify the equal moral standing of human beings by relating it 
to the existence of morally significant properties that individuals 
possess equally. For example, following Aristotle, Jeff McMahan 
and James Griffin have argued that rationality is the main 
significant moral property.32 However, this view either proves too 
much, by attributing equal moral status to nonhuman animals, or 
  
30 ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?Contemporary Debates in Political 
Philosophy, Christiano T. and Christman J. (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2009), 159. 
31Larry Temkin, Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 7. Also, 
notice that a pluralist who believes that both equality and utility matter can be 
a non-instrumental and instrumental egalitarian at the same time, although she 
must accept some kind of hierarchy of principles. 
32 Jeff ????????????????????? ??????????????????? ?The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 
12, Issue 1, 2008), 81?104. James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
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it proves too little because it clashes with our intuitions that 
children, people with disabilities and normal-functioning adults 
have equal moral status. 
???? ????????? ??? ????? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ??????
down to which scheme of distributional equality best treats 
people as equals. ??? ????????????? ???????? ???????? ??? ?? ?????????
condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and 
not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they 
regard ??? ??????????????33 This question has been the object of 
one of the richest and most vibrant debates in the egalitarian 
??????????? ???? ??? ??????? ?????????? ??? ??????? ??????? ?????? ?????
candidates that include: equality of resources, equality of human 
relationships (or relational egalitarianism)34, equality of capability 
and equality of welfare and opportunity for welfare.35 The 
  
33 Gerald Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political 
Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 3. 
34 Relational egalitarians refuse to consider themselves as proponents of a 
distributive account of equal????? ????? ???? ? ????? ????????? ??? ??? ?????? ??????
?????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????? ??????? ?????? ??? ???? ????????? ????????
Scheffler, Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 191). However, this ideal of equality is 
not categorically different from the distributive ones. Being treated as an equal, 
being respected and listened are things that happen to individuals. The quality 
of social relations can be thereby described as a form of distributive 
egalitarianism where equal relations among citizens is the most important 
metric of equality (Marc Fleurbaey, Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008, 246).  
35 For a defense of equality of resources see Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000);; On equality of human relations, 
see Elisabeth Anderson, ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ?????????? (Ethics, Vol. 103, 
Issue 9, 1999), 287?337;; Samuel Scheffler, ?????? ??? ?????????????????
(Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 31, Issue 1, 2003), 5?39;; and Michael Walzer, 
Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 
1983). The main defenses of equality of capabilities have been developed by 
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relevance of this debate is at least twofold: on the one hand, it 
sheds light on the egalitarian ideal of justice, and on the other, it 
is motivated by the fact that equality of one kind often requires 
inequality of another. The debate is extremely complex and 
voluminous and an accurate analysis of this debate is beyond the 
scope of this paper. In the following paragraphs, I will assume 
that equal opportunity for welfare is the most valuable dimension for 
equality. This position is not extremely controversial, as the kind 
of equality which I am going to defend is also accepted by most 
egalitarians.   
Unlike the ideas of equality of resources and equality of 
capabilities, the conception of equality of opportunity for welfare 
is grounded in a concern for people leading genuinely good lives. 
The principle claims that people must have equal opportunities to 
obtain welfare or well-??????????????ust face an array of options 
????? ??? ??????????? ??? ?????? ?????? ????????? ??? ?????? ??? ????
?????????? ???? ??????????? ????????????? ??? ????????36 The lack of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Amartya Sen in ????????????? ?????????? ??????????????? The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values, Vol. 1, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, reprinted in Sen 
A., Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), 353?369 and 
The Idea of Justice (Cambridge MASS: Harvard University Press, 2009) and 
Martha Nussbaum, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 6, 1988), 145?84;; 
??????? ???????????? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? ??????? of Aristotelian 
?????????????? ?Political Theory, Vol. 20, Issue 2, 1992), 202?246;; Creating 
Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). For some of the 
most influential defenses of equal opportunity for welfare, see Richard 
????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ???????????? ????????????? ?Philosophical Studies, 
Vol. 56, 1989), 77????? ???? ??????? ?????? ???? ???? ????????? ??? ????????????
??????????Ethics, Vol. 99, Issue 4, 1989), 906?944. 
36???? ???????????? ????? ?????? ??? ?? ???????? ??? ???? ????????????? ??????e are 
?????????????? ??????????? ?????????????? ???? ???? ???? ??????????? ?????? ????? ???
she were to engage in thoroughgoing calm deliberation about her preferences 
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consensus in modern pluralistic societies on what well-being or 
welfare really is makes it difficult to establish a conception of 
welfare that could serve as a shared standard to help governments 
????????? ???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
allocated resources.37 But notwithstanding their differences, 
alternative conceptions of welfare can still have something in 
common and this can be used as a guiding principle for policy 
development. Thus, one way to overcome the disagreement is to 
outline a basic notion of welfare that is acceptable to most 
conceptions of welfare.  
Equality in the satisfaction of basic needs is a suitable 
candidate for such a basic notion of welfare. Although equality 
can be expressed in many dimensions, it ultimately requires us to 
focus on inequality in the satisfaction of basic needs. One 
straightforward reason is that no meaningful life is possible in the 
absence of the satisfaction of these basic needs, including all the 
necessary components of human well-?????????????????????????
existence depends, in fact, on certain fundamental necessities. 
Minimally, it depends on physical and psychological preservation, 
which in turn depends on minimum levels of food, shelter, 
?????????? ???????? ????? ?????? ???? ????? ????????38 In this sense, 
food, shelter and healthcare are some examples of fundamental 
needs. They are clearly not exhaustive, but they constitute a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????39  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
with full knowledge about her actual preferences and their resistance to change 
unmarred by cognit???? ?????? ????????? ????????? ?????????? ???? ??????
???????????????? ?????????Philosophical Studies, Vol. 56, 1988, 83?85). 
37 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000), 285. 
38 Larry Temkin, Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 23. 
39 Ibid., Note that the present claim does not support the absolute equal 
distribution of goods to the satisfaction of basic needs, because this is not 
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Of course, my approach faces the burden of specifying what 
needs these are and I do not intend to provide an answer to this 
here. However, considerations about undeserved inequality in the 
satisfaction of basic needs, say, health and healthcare (and other 
????????????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ????????????? ??? ???? ??????????
?????????????????????suggesting that the gap between the sick and 
the well may be more significant than inequalities in other 
spheres.40 This implies that equal opportunity for basic needs 
satisfaction is the metric of equality which is most important to 
treat people as equals. This idea can be termed the main scheme of 
distributional equality. 
The main scheme of distributional equality is not a claim 
about sufficiency. The point I am making here is that the 
inequalities between the needy and the better off are the most 
critical inequalities and therefore they should be the main focus 
of egalitarians as well as of policies of egalitarianism. But this 
does not imply that we must not be moved even by undeserved 
inequalities among just the well-to-do.  
The reach of my claim can be extended to the reduction of 
inequalities in opportunity for education. Usually, egalitarians 
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
talents and having a fair chance to get a good occupation in 
society. For this reason, if education was one of the crucial 
?? ???????? ???? ????????? ????-being, egalitarians would have 
significant reasons to also be concerned with undeserved 
inequalities in opportunities for education.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
necessary for mere existence. For instance, although food is a necessary 
resource for the subsistence of human beings, egalitarians need only claim that 
all individuals must have access to at least enough food to guarantee a decent 
and respectful life.  
40 Ibid., 24. 
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The main scheme of distributional equality converges with the 
politica?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
effective government. Although meritocrats do not believe that 
equality is intrinsically valuable, the main scheme of distributional 
equality does converge with effective government to some extent. 
Meritocrats think that one of the major aims of the ruler and all 
other officials is to serve the ruled.41 Thus, they are against 
fundamental inequalities to the extent that they prevent people to 
live better lives.   
The main scheme of distributional equality has significant 
implications for the egalitarian assessment of political 
meritocracy. It suggests that, from an egalitarian perspective, 
considerations of undeserved inequalities in the satisfaction of 
basic needs trump a concern for an equal distribution of political 
power. The reason is that although equal political influence may 
matter for some egalitarian reasons, it is not a necessary 
precondition for a worthwhile human existence. A special 
consideration for inequality in basic needs satisfaction entails the 
value of political equality to the extent that it contributes to the 
reduction of inequalities in the satisfaction of basic needs.42  
This implies that, theoretically, from an egalitarian standpoint, 
most experts or virtuous individuals do not have a claim to rule. 
Even in the presence of perfect equality of access, having better 
  
41 Joseph Chan, Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 30. 
42 The preceding argument does not imply that we always ought to pursue a 
drastic undermining of political equality if this could give someone the basic 
minimum that they lacked. As we have said earlier, while egalitarians claim that 
equality is an important ideal, many of them believe that equality is not all that 
matters. Therefore, the resistance to strong increments of political inequality 
would not be paradoxical if it was motivated by valuable ideals other than 
equality.  
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academic qualifications, expertise or moral virtues than others do 
not necessarily meet the egalitarian main concern principle. 
Ultimately, egalitarians should be interested in the results that a 
political selection system in a particular socio-economic context 
can achieve. Egalitarian justice requires allocating political power 
among the members of society not according to their individual 
merits but rather according to how well a political institution 
performs in relation to the well-being of the people.  
Yet, egalitarians can have a reason for political meritocracy if 
this can guarantee better egalitarian outcomes than alternative 
selection systems. In other words, the egalitarian support for 
political meritocracy presupposes that such a system can 
contribute to reduce inequalities better than alternative ones.43 So, 
under the principle of main scheme of distributional equality, the 
unequal distribution of political power presupposed by political 
meritocracy can be justified to the extent that it contributes to 
maximizing the egalitarian outcomes of the overall political 
system.  
This is a conditional defense of political meritocracy. And as 
such, it does not ascribe to political meritocracy any intrinsic 
value. The idea that a political regime is more desirable than 
others if it can lead to better egalitarian outcomes opens to the 
possibility that egalitarians ought to accept or reject meritocratic 
mechanisms depending upon how meritocratic and alternative 
selection mechanisms perform under some circumstances. This 
conditional aspect of my argument is the basis of its 
reasonableness as the idea that one specific selection mechanisms 
ought to be appropriate in all conditions is unreasonable. The 
  
43 ??? ???????????? ???????? ???????????? ????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ????????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????The Journal of Moral 
Philosophy, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 2012), 31?54.  
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world is populated by varied political communities, which are 
characterized by, for example, great cultural, economic or 
geographical differences. This diversity makes it extremely 
improbable that desired political outcomes can be achieved in 
various places through the same political system. And 
presumably, a political system has higher chances to be effective 
if it takes into consideration the specific conditions of its society. 
Of course, this does not exclude the fact that all political 
communities should abide by some general political principles 
such as individual right to live, freedom from discrimination and 
equality before the law but it illustrates some of the limits of 





What are the bases of a meritocratic distributions of power? 
And are they articulated enough for political meritocracy to be 
compared with contemporary Western democratic theories? I 
have suggested that political meritocracy is the expression of a 
principle of substantive equality of political opportunity and as 
such, it competes on an equal footing with another interpretation 
of this principle, namely democratic equality of fair opportunity. 
Political meritocracy is characterized by two main tenets: on the 
one hand, political meritocracy selects candidates based on the 
qualities and skills that are relevant to the political positions, and 
on the other it ought to provide people with equal chances to 
develop these abilities and expertise. In this, political meritocracy 
offers a morally coherent position. A concern for equality does 
not entail unconditional support for political meritocracy. From 
an egalitarian standpoint, meritocratic selections of future leaders 
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can be justified to the extent to which they contribute to increase 
equality of basic needs satisfaction and opportunity for education 
more than other political procedures. If these suggestions are 
correct, society has a reason to promote or select future 
politicians according to their merits, if this provides better 
outcomes. 
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